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Communications networks give 
rise to network effects.
? Access Externalities
? Benefits to members of a network from 
being able to send messages to a given 
subscriber
? Widely studied
? Call Externalities
? Benefits to the party receiving a message
? Widely ignored (until recently)
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Let’s meet our happy couple.
? A and B Can exchange 0 or 1 messages
? Key assumption 1: already on the network
? Key assumption 2: lack of tit-for-tat calling
? Benefits vA and vB
? May be stochastic at time of message initiation
? Types ωA and ωB
? Innate characteristics and information
? Marginal cost of message exchange, m
? Video files expensive even on the Internet
? Even m = 0 can lead to non-zero prices
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There are two cases to consider.
? One-way calling
? One-way technologies (e.g., paging)
? Only one party knows value (e.g., calling to make 
a dinner reservation)
? Non-strategic behavior due to bounded rationality
? Two-way calling
? Two-way technologies with two informed, 
strategic parties
? Will focus on one-way calling today with A
the sender and B the receiver
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We will examine several different 
pricing objectives.
? Total surplus maximization
? First best: exchange message iff 
vA + vB ≥ m
? Information constrained: exchange 
message iff E{vA + vB | ωA, ωB} ≥ m
? Profit constrained (Ramsey pricing):         
p + r ≥ m
? Profit maximization
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Complexities of Learning
? Suppose it is common knowledge that 
? A knows the value of vA
? B does not know the value of vB.
? Suppose vB = vA (coincident interests)
? First-best message exchange can be supported by setting p 
= m/2 = r
? B takes A’s calling as a positive signal about the value of 
answering
? Suppose vB = µ−vA (opposing interests)
? Big trouble
? B takes A’s calling as a negative signal about the value of 
answering
24 February 2005
Sender or Receiver
7
Caller ID can raise or lower 
welfare.
? Caller ID may raise equilibrium welfare under the 
total-surplus-maximizing prices with or without a 
network profitability constraint.
? Breaks pooling that would have blocked efficient 
message exchange.
? Caller ID may lower equilibrium welfare under the 
total-surplus-maximizing prices with or without a 
network profitability constraint.
? Breaks pooling that would have helped internalize call 
externalities.
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Two conditions for when to 
tax spam.
? Current email prices do not internalize 
call externalities
? A tax on spam can be optimal when
? the expected social value of message 
exchange is an increasing function of the 
sender’s expected value; and
? the sender’s value sometimes exceeds 
the social value.
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Maintained assumptions going 
forward.
A1. For i = A,B: vi = ωi + ηi , where ηi is a random variable 
satisfying E{ηi|ωi} ≡ E{ηi|ωi , ωj} ≡ 0.
? ωi contains no additional information useful to j in predicting the 
expected value of vj conditional on the information he or she 
already possesses, ωj .
? Ex ante, the parties’ information, ωi and ωj, could be correlated.
? ωi is now party i’s expected value of communicating.
? A2. Pr{ωA + ωB > m} > 0 and ωA + ωB < m, where ωi is the 
infimum of the support of ωi, i = A,B.
? Rules out trivial never-efficient-trade and always-efficient-trade 
cases.
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Efficient Message Exchange
Messages should
be exchanged
ωB
m
m
ωA
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Equilibrium Message Exchange
ωB
ωAmp
messages
exchanged
m
r
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Proposition 1 roughly characterizes 
socially optimal prices.
Suppose the parties’ expected values of message 
exchange, ωA and ωB, are independently distributed 
with positive densities defined everywhere on their 
supports.
• Use of a single price pair cannot achieve information-
constrained efficient message exchange.
• If the network provider is not subject to a 
profitability constraint, then socially optimal prices 
satisfy p + r < m.
• If the network provider is subject to p + r ≥ m, then 
socially optimal prices satisfy p + r = m.
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Key Mathematics
? Survival (demand) function
Si(ω) = prob{ωi ≥ ω}
? Expected welfare when p + r = m
SB(m-p)∫p∞ SA(ω)dω + SA (p)∫m-p∞ SB(ω)dω
? First-order condition
S’(p)∫m-p∞ S(ω)dω - S’(m-p)∫p∞ S(ω)dω = 0
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Proposition 2 characterizes the 
nature of Ramsey prices.
Suppose the network is subject to a profitability constraint and
the parties’ expected values of message exchange, ωA and ωB, 
are independently and identically distributed.
(i) If the hazard rate is everywhere increasing, then prices that 
divide the cost of a message equally between the sender and 
receiver are the unique socially optimal prices.
(ii) If the hazard rate is constant, then any prices such that ω ≤ 
p ≤ m− ω and r = m− p are socially optimal, where ω is the 
infimum of the common support.
(iii) If the hazard rate is everywhere decreasing, then there are 
two socially optimal price pairs: one in which the send price 
equals ω and one in which the receive price equals ω. In 
each case, the complementary price is set at m − ω.
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The effects of a move toward 
equal cost sharing
ωB
m
ωA
m/2 m
m/2
r
p
I
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Proposition 3 deals with some of 
the asymmetric cases.
Suppose that the parties’ expected values of message 
exchange, ωA and ωB, are independently distributed 
according to differentiable distribution functions with 
associated densities ψA(·) and ψB(·), respectively.
If (a) ψj(ω) crosses ψi(ω) once from above at ωc ≥ 
m/2 and (b) the hazard rates associated with ψi(·) 
and ψj(·) are non-decreasing, then party i pays more 
than party j under any socially optimal pricing scheme 
that satisfies the network profitability constraint.
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Profit Maximization
? Consider the profit maximizer’s 
problem in two stages:
? For a fixed margin, choose p and r
? Choose a margin
? For a given margin, the firm wants to 
maximize the probability of message 
exchange
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Proposition 4 gives conditions under 
which profit-maximizing prices have 
the right structure but are too high.
Suppose the parties’ expected values of message exchange, ωA and 
ωB, are independently and identically distributed. The sum of the 
profit-maximizing send and receive prices exceeds the sum of welfare-
maximizing send and receive prices. Moreover,
1. If the hazard rate is everywhere increasing, then prices that 
divide the cost of a message equally between the sender and 
receiver are the unique profit-maximizing prices.
2. If the hazard rate is constant, then S(ω) = e(ω−ω)/µ, µ a positive 
constant and ω the infimum of the common support, and the 
profit-maximizing margin is µ. Any prices such that ω ≤ p ≤ µ + 
m − ω and r = µ + m − p maximize profits.
3. If the hazard rate is everywhere decreasing, then there are two 
profit-maximizing price pairs: in one the send price equals ω and 
in the other the receive price equals ω.
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In general, profit maximization can 
lead to two biases.
? Given the margin, a profit maximizing 
network sets relative prices to maximize 
the probability of message exchange, 
rather than the expected value.
? A profit maximizer sets overall prices 
too high in order to extract consumer 
surplus.
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Menus of prices can be beneficial to 
welfare and profits.
Consider an arbitrary menu of price pairs.
1. Adding an option for which the send price is greater than any 
existing send price and the sum of the send and receive prices 
is greater than or equal to the marginal cost of a message 
weakly raises welfare.
2. Expanding the menu by adding an option with a send price that 
is less than an existing send price, or for which the sum of the
send and receive prices is less than the marginal cost of a 
message, can reduce welfare.
3. Profits weakly rise when an option is added for which (i) the 
send price is greater than any existing send price and (ii) the 
sum of the send and receive prices is greater than or equal to 
the sum of any existing option.
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Unequal prices are optimal in the 
2 x one-way calling case.
Proposition 6. Suppose the joint density function for the 
parties’ expected values of message exchange, ωA and 
ωB, is continuous and strictly positive at (m/2,m/2). 
Then under a pair of one-way calling models (i.e., two-
way calling with non-strategic users), the socially 
optimal breakeven send and receive prices are not 
equal.
Proposition 7. Under a pair of one-way calling models, if 
prices p = k and r = m − k are socially optimal for 
some constant, k, then prices p = m − k and r = k are 
also socially optimal.
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Conclusion
? Viewing the sender as the “cost causer” is 
misleading.
? Efficient pricing requires consideration of 
demand conditions, even when marginal costs 
are constant.
? Non-zero prices to both sides are generally 
socially and privately optimal.
? Pricing menus are generally socially and 
privately optimal.
